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Abstract - In early 2014 State Health Insurance program was 
launched by Indonesian Government. The program is called 
BadanPenyelenggaraJaminanSosial (BPJS). The mission of the 
BPJS is that in the end of 2019 all Indonesian People are already 
covered by the State Health Insurance. 
This research is aimed to investigate that moral hazard is 
inevitable from the public health insurance. Using convenience 
method, 1011 data were collected. There are 893 member of 
BPJS, and there are 117 were not member of BPJS yet. One is 
datum missing. Cross-Tabulation and Chi-Square are employed 
to test the availability of moral hazard. 
It is found out that moral hazard is inevitable in the health 
insurance of BPJS. They are who are already member of BPJS 
tend to visit doctor frequently than that they are who are not 
member yet. They are whose premium are paid out of pocket tend 
to visit doctor more frequently than that they are whose premium 
is partly or totally paid by other parties. 
Keywords: health insurance, moral hazard, effect lemon, 
cherry picking theory, Cross Tabulation, Chi-Squares 
I. INTRODUCTION 
BPJS a state enterprise which provides services for social 
health insurance in Indonesia was launched on 1 January 
2014. BPJS is an abbreviation for 
BadanPenyelenggaraJaninanSosialKesehatan. Under 
Indonesian Government Regulation No. 24 2011, BPJS was 
designed to provide social insurance program toward 
universal health care coverage in Indonesia 
(https://www.bpjsketenagakerjaan.go.id,2011) BPJS 
program is an Indonesian government bigstep program to 
improve public health. However as a new program, the 
implementation of the program faced many problems, which 
need to be assessed. One important problem was that in 
2017, financial deficit of BPJS was 8.7 trillion rupiah. In 
2018, the deficit was 16.5 trillion rupiah. 
It was claimed that by the end of 2016, 70 percent of 
Indonesian population or about 174 million people were 
already covered by BPJS. It was targeted by BPJS that 
members of BPJS increase up to 201 million members by 
the end of 2017. By the end of 2019, it was targeted that all 
Indonesian people or about 257million people were covered 
by BPJS (http://www.finance.detik.com, 2017). 
By the 1st November 2017 it was reported that the 
members of health insurance of BPJS recruited were 
183.579.083 which were less than that have been targeted. 
There are three categories of BPJS members. The first is 
who are fully subsidized by local and central government. 
There are about 111.593.654 or 60.8 percent of the whole 
health insurance BPJS members which are under this 
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category. The term for members of BPJS under the first 
category is they are whose premium is fully paid by 
Indonesian government (PBI). The members of BPJS under 
the category of PBI, the premium are totally subsidized by 
government. 
The second category is members BPJS whose premium of 
BPJS are partly or fully subsidized by the company where 
they work. 
The third category is members of BPJS whose premium 
independently paid by them self. The term of member of 
BPJS under this category is Independent members (PM). 
There are about 29.006.196 people or about 16 percent of 
the whole members of health insurance BPJS which are 
under this category. 
Since that the members of BPJS are already 70 % of total 
population of Indonesia, according to the law of the large 
number, BPJS should have a good estimate of the fair price 
of the premium. According to the BPJS report in the end of 
2016 BPJS suffered from deficit up to 5 trillion rupiah, or 
about almost 10 % of the total claim. In this research, it will 
be studied the causes of the inefficiency of the health 
insurance. 
Moral hazard is one of the most suspected causes of the 
inefficiency. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Theoretically, there are tree explanations how health 
insurance are deficit or inefficient. The theory are 
asymmetric information, risk-type preference of insured 
agents which are lemon principle or cherry picking, and 
moral hazard theory. Asymmetric information is happened 
when one party has more information than another party. In 
the case of health insurance, the insured agents have more 
information about their health than that of insurer agents. 
The insured agents know better about their health. Since the 
insured agents have better information about their health 
than the insurer, for a certain rate of premium, the riskier 
agents tend to buy the insurance than that of healthier agents 
(Binger, 1988; Hackman et.al., 2012;. Since the insured 
agents are dominated by the riskier agents, so it is expected 
that the insurance holders tend to go to visit doctor more 
than the uninsured agents. The price of premium tend to be 
more expensive. The health insurance is inefficient. 
Second is theory of risk-type preference on health 
insurance. The theory are lemon principle and cherry 
picking. According to lemon principle, they are who high 
risk tend to buy insurance premium. It is predicted by this 




Moral Hazard on Public Health Insurance: 
Evidence from BPJS in Indonesia 
Rogatianus Maryatmo, Jeanne Ellyawati 
International Conference on Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Engineering & Technology (ICMPET-19)  
|24th -25th May, 2019 | KITS, Markapur, Andhra Pradesh, India 
480 
Published By: 
Blue Eyes Intelligence Engineering 
& Sciences Publication  Retrieval Number: G10390587C219/19©BEIESP 
 
that they are tend to visit physical doctor more frequently 
than non-insurance holders. The second type of risk-
preference is theory of cherry picker. Chery picker chooses 
the best cherry to sell to market for fruit. The worse cherry 
is made for juice. According to the theory of cherry picking, 
the economic agents who risk averter tend to buy health 
insurance to cover they health risk. The economic agents 
who have better health condition prepare for her health risk 
they probably encounter. It is predicted by the theory that 
the insurance holder tend to visit doctor less frequent than 
that uninsured agents (Brownea and Richterb, 2014; Pardo 
et.al, 2012; Amy and Gary., 2006; Pardo and Schott, 2012; 
Jingwei, 2017). The end result is uncertain. If lemon effect 
is higher than of cherry effect, the higher the number of 
insurance member, the more inefficient the insurance policy 
is. The higher the cherry effect than of the lemon effect, the 
more efficient the insurance policy is. 
The third issue which is frequently discussed in the health 
insurance is moral hazard. According to Mendoza (2010), 
moral hazard is the change in economic behavior, because 
the economic agents are protected and insured, and the 
premium is paid byother parties. The economic agents who 
are already insured, they tend to be less careful than that the 
uninsured agents. (Wang et.al., 2008; Daval and Kaestner, 
2009; Zhiqiang, 2013; Eisenhouer, 2006; Seog, 2012). 
Mendoza (2010) also reported that moral hazard also happen 
to the health care providers. Since it is guaranteed that the 
medical cost are covered by health insurance, so the health 
care provider tend to offer unnecessary medical treatment. 
Accordingly, it is predicted the insured agents tend to visit 
doctor more frequently. The health insurance is inefficient, 
because of moral hazard. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
There are 1010 people are taken as sample for the study. 
Among them, 893 people are BPJS health insurance holder, 
and the rest 117 people are not covered by BPJS yet. The 
sample are taken from Special Region of Yogyakarta 
Province. The sample taken by convenience method. All 
everybody conveniently met are taken as sample. Tool of 
analysis is Cross Tabulation and Chi Square Test. Using 
cross tabulation could be investigated the trend of the 
movement of each groups investigated. The Cross 
Tabulation could be represented as bellow in Table 1. (Lind 
et.al., 2015, p 544-545). 
If there is no differences in frequencies of visiting 
medical doctor between member and non-member BPJS, 
then a11 ≈ a12, a21 ≈ a22, and a31 
a32. If there is a trend that member of BPJS tend to visit 
medical doctor frequently than that of non-member BPJS, 
then a31 > a32, and a11 < a12. 
Statistical test to be employed is Chi Squares (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009, p 131). Chi Squares test compare between 
actual and expected distribution of the observation. The Chi 
Squared formula could be written as bellow. 
 
∑  =(   )2 
2=   =1 −  0 
(1) 
 
Chi squares statistic is represented by χ2, ft is actual 
distribution, f0 is expected distribution. If there is no 
different between actual and expected distribution, Chi 
squares statistics tends to be low. 
If there is no trend, the expected will be close to the actual 
distribution. If there is no trend the calculated Chi will be 
close to zero. If there is a trend, statistically the expected 
distribution will be different from the the actual distribution 
of observation. 
 
Table 1. Frequencies of Visiting Medical Doctors 
according to Categorical Member of BPJS 
 




BPJS Non-Member of BPJS 
Doctors in the 
Recent Years   
Never a11 a12 
Once a21 a22 
More than Once a31 a32 
Author’s Result 
IV. IV. RESEARCH RESULT 
There are three hypothesis that need to be statistically 
tested. First it is investigated the differences in the 
frequency of accessing the medical doctors by those who are 
being member of BPJS and non-member of BPJS. 
As it is expected by theory, since there are effect lemon 
and effect cherry picking, the result is uncertain. If effect 
lemon is higher than cherry picking, they are who have been 
member of health insurance tend to visit medical doctor 
more frequently. If cherry picking effect is higher than that 
of lemon effect, they are who have been member of health 
insurance tend to visit medical doctor less frequently. 
The result as shown in table 2, reveals that members of 
BPJS more frequently visit medical doctor than that of non-
BPJS members. The above table shows that among non-
members of BPJS there are 89.7 % of them never visit 
medical doctors. Among the members of BPJS there are 
only 28.3% that never visit medical doctors. Among the 
members of BPJS there are 40.5% who visit medical doctors 
once. Among the non-members of BPJS there are only 7.7% 
who visit medical doctor once. Among members of BPJS 
there are 31.7% who visit medical doctors more than once. 
Since among non-members of BPJS there are only 2.6% 
who visit medical doctors more than once. It could be 
concluded that there is a trend that member of BPJS tend to 
visit medical doctor more frequently than of non-member of 
BPJS. 
The trend is statistically tested using Chi Squares test. 
Using formula on equation (1), Chi statistics is calculated. 
The calculation results of Chi Statistics is 54.27. Compared 
to the Chi tables with degree of freedom of 5 and α = 0.01, 
which is equal 15, the Chi statistics is far greater. So it is 
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trend that the member ofBPJS is more frequently to visit 
medical doctor than non-member of BPJS. 
There are two explanation with the trend. Firstly is that 
probably there is adverse selection. They are who is being 
member BPJS are they are who is more vulnerable with 
illness, so they tend to visit medical doctor more frequently 
than that of non-member of BPJS. The second explanation is 
that there is moral hazard. Member and non-member health 
insurance of BPJS they are from the same population. They 
have the same degree of health. As soon as they are being 
members of health insurance of BPJS, they change their 
behavior and visit medical doctor more frequently than non-
member of BPJS. 
Those conclusion is in contrast with Hoffman and 
Browne (2013) finding that cherry picking effect is higher 
than lemon effect in their study on health insurance in 
Germany. Those conclusion is in accordance with the 
finding of Pardo and Schott (2012), Jingwei (2017) in their 
study of health insurance consecutively in Chillie and 
Hongkong. 
Secondly it is investigated the differences in the 
frequency of accessing the medical doctors by member of 
BPJS between those premium is paid by themselves. Other 
parties in this case oar government and private companies. 
The result shows that among member of BPJS whose 
premium is paid by them-selves, there are 20.8% who never 
visit medical doctors in the recent year. Since among 
member of BPJS whose premium is paid by other parties 
there are 32.8% of them who never visit medical doctors in 
the recent year Among members of BPJS whose premium is 
paid by them-selves, there are 46.6% of them who visit 
medical doctors once in the recent years. Among members 
of BPJS whose premium is paid by other parties, there are 
only 36.8 % of them who visit medical doctors once in the 
recent years. Among members of BPJS whose premium is 
paid by them-selves, there are 32.6% of them who visit 
medical doctormore than once in the recent year. Since only 
there are 30.4% of them, who visit medical doctors more 
than once among BPJS members whose premium is paid 
 
Table 2 : Percentage Frequency of Visiting Medical Doctors Between Members and Non-Members BPJS, 2017 
   % Categorical of Sample 
Frequency of Visiting Medical 
Doctors  
Member of 
BPJS  Non-Member of BPJS 
in the Recent Years     
Never  28.3  89.7 
Once  40.5  7.7 
More than Once  31.7  2.6 
Chi Statistic = 54.26915*    
Sources : Research Result ; * significant in α = 
0.01    
 
doctors more than once among BPJS members whose 
premium is paid by other parties. It is statistically 
significant, that among BPJS members that they are whose 
premium is paid by them-selves tend to visit medical doctors 
more frequently than whose premium is paid by other 
parties. 
Those trend is statistically not significant in α = 0.05 with 
degree of freedom 5.. The Chi statistics is 3.915, since the 
chi table in α = 0.05 and with degree of freedom 5 is 15. Chi 
table is higher than chi calculated. Hypothesis that they are 
who pay the premium of health insurance by themselves 
rather than paid by other parties tend to go to visit medical 
doctor more frequently is not accepted. It could be 
concluded that both categories statistically visit medical 
doctors equally. 
Slightly different result found out by Olayiwola and 
Kazeem (2019). Their research in Nigeria uncovered that in 
the case of public health insurance, the higher the income, 
the more frequent they visit medical doctors. In this 
research, they are who are and not subsidized visit medical 
doctor equally. 
Finally, it is investigated the differences in the frequency 
of accessing the medical doctors by all health insurance 
BPJS members between those premium is subsidized and 
non-subsidized by government. The subsidy is designed to 
provide social insurance program toward international 
health care coverage. If the program is well executed, the 
economic agents who get subsidy tend to visit medical 
doctors more frequently. 
The table shows that subsidized members tend to visit 
medical doctors more frequently than that of non-subsidized 
members. There are 43.6% of that subsidized, and only 
36.4% that of non-subsidized by Indonesian government 
visit medical doctor once during one year period. There are 
38.5 % of that subsidized, and only 27% of that non-
subsidized visit medical doctors more than once during one 
year. 
The table shows that subsidized members tend to visit 
medical doctors more frequently than that of non-subsidized 
members. There are 43.6% of that subsidized, and only 
36.4% that of non-subsidized by Indonesian government 
visit medical doctor once during one year period. There are 
38.5 % of that subsidized, and only 27% of that non-
subsidized visit medical doctors more than once during one 
year. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is confirmed that moral hazard is happened in the BPJS 
case in Indonesia. The moral hazard is triggered by the 
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The patients who are already member of BPJS tend to visit 
doctor more easily and frequently. Since the health service 
providers payments are also insured by the health insurance, 
they tend to suggest all every medical treatment that 
probably is not necessarily taken to the patients. 
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Table 3 : Percentage Frequency of Visiting Medical 
Doctors by Member of BPJS Between Whose Premium 
is Paid By Them-Selves and Paid by Other Parties 2017 
 




Them Selves Paid by Other Parties 
Doctors in the Recent 
Years   
Never 20.8 32.8 
Once 46.6 36.8 
More than Once 32.6 30.4 
Total 100 100 
Chi Statistics = 3.915   
Sources : Research Result 
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